Abstract only (conference submission). This abstract was submitted in response to the CfP Reason in Perception (University of Graz, May 7–8, 2026). It is posted for record and orientation. The full paper is not publicly available and may change.

Abstract

Recent debates about reason in perception often treat perceptual normativity as a source of epistemic authority. Because perception is subject to standards of correctness, it is taken to justify belief and, in turn, to reveal something about how reality itself is structured. This paper argues that this step goes too far.

I draw a strict line between perceptual constraint and ontological commitment. Perceptual norms govern how appearances may be taken up within inquiry. They guide correction, limit error, and support shared judgment across agents. But they do not license claims about what exists, or about the structure of reality apart from those practices. Without this distinction, perceptual success is too easily mistaken for metaphysical insight.

The central claim is that perception does not itself contain reasons. Perception gives us appearances. Reasons arise only when we assess, test, and correct those appearances. Perception shapes which beliefs are viable, but it does not justify belief on its own. To place reasons inside perception is to confuse a condition on reasoning with an act of reasoning.

This distinction blocks a familiar escalation in accounts of perceptual normativity. From the fact that perception is norm-guided, philosophers infer that reality must be shaped so as to answer to those norms. I argue that this inference is invalid. Normative success explains stability and reliability within inquiry, not access to reality as it is in itself.

The paper offers a disciplined way to take perceptual normativity seriously while resisting its inflation into ontological claim. Perception constrains belief without carrying metaphysical authority, preserving its epistemic role without overreach.